Social Justice, Beyond Political Identities

Introduction

“We want an Argentina that is socially just, economically independent, and politically sovereign”: this is the eighteenth of twenty truths of Justicialism read by Juan Domingo Perón on October 17, 1950 (Torre, 2002).^[1] Social justice was at the heart of the movement for the “new Argentina.” It is no coincidence that the party that undertook this political task was named “Justicialism,” a name that continues to be used to this day. Given the centrality of social justice, one would expect the literature on this issue to be extensive. However, despite the numerous studies and reflections on Peronism, only a handful of texts specifically address social justice, and even then, the discussion is often peripheral and unsystematic. The recent attempt by Juan Manuel Palacio (2018) ought to be highlighted: he demonstrates the existence of a Peronist justice, characterized by a set of judicial policies designed to promote and regulate the judicialization of political conflict and to avoid the intervention of the judiciary. Through a close examination of labor legislation implemented by Peron’s government, particularly in rural areas, Palacio reveals the emergence of a new legal culture in which workers played an active role in shaping the consolidation of the new legal system. Palacio claims that, as a result, “even the most well-known figures became increasingly indomitable workers, whose aspirations were gradually being integrated into their identities” (2018, 129).

According to Palacio, the legacy of Peronism lies in the incorporation of law as a central component of the identitarian assets of subaltern sectors. This enables Palacio to also examine the hypothesis that Perón did not respect institutionality. Palacio’s Book—Peronist Justice—highlights the significant body of labor legislation inherited from the Peronist era (Palacio, 2018). However, Palacio’s analysis equates social justice with judicial discourse. From a theorical and political perspective, one might ask whether social justice encompasses more than just a set of laws or norms.

A theoretical inquiry into social justice is particularly timely in the current theoretical and political context, where issues of justice have taken on unprecedented significance.^[2] Additionally, it is also worth noting that, in the horizon of this discussion, the concept of social justice seems to vary in meaning depending on the specific regional context.

Therefore, my aim is to problematize^[3] the concept of social justice. To achieve this goal, in the first section, I outline the main perspectives on social justice found in the most influential studies of Argentine political and social theory. I identify two predominant models that are often opposed: on the one hand, those who view social justice as a means of integrating the masses into the stablished order; on the other hand, those who argue that social justice is part of a subjectivation process, implying the disruption of the existing order and the emergence of a new political subject. Building on these considerations, the second section presents an alternative framework that diverges both from the instrumental understanding and the depiction of social justice as an empty signifier that has underpinned the meaning of Peronist political discourse. Thus, I argue that social justice is rather a three-stage movement comprising three moments: speaking, listening, and recognizing.

Social justice: identification vs. subjectivation

To explore the status of social justice in studies on early Peronism in Argentine political and social theory, I will outline a debate that appears to draw a dividing line in the field of political thought. Although this dichotomy may lead to an oversimplification of the complexities that each of the two approaches exhibit internally, it remains useful to maintain this binary distinction in order to present the main lines of the controversy surrounding Peronism in a clear manner. By highlighting this division, we gain insight into the understanding of Peronist social justice and its position within theoretical and political discourse.

Therefore, I will discuss two hypotheses regarding social justice during early Peronism: the identification hypothesis and the subjectivation hypothesis. This distinction draws on the ideas of Jacques Rancière, as presented in Disagreement (1999), where he posits the existence of two logics of human being-together. On the one hand, there is the police logic,^[4] which establishes an order of bodies and assigns them a specific place and function according to their properties, their names or lack thereof, thereby defining the modes of doing, modes of being and modes of saying which ensure “that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable” (1999, 29). In other words, police logic produces an order by identifying each part of the parts within a community in a specific sensible distribution.^[5]

On the other hand, political logic displaces bodies from the places to which they were assigned, rendering visible what was previously invisible and making audible what was previously inaudible. According to Rancière, politics emerges when those who do not have the right to be counted as part of the community manage to be counted as such anyway, because politics “breaks with the tangible configuration whereby parties and parts or lack of them are defined by a presupposition that, by definition, has no place in that configuration—that of the part of those who have no part” (1999, 29–30). Thus, Rancière argues that politics is related to modes of subjectivation, since subjectivation involves the production of an instance of enunciation and the capacity of enunciation which do not have a place within the given field of experience. In other words, every subjectivation implies a disidentification with the previously assigned positions, it is a “removal from the naturalness of a place, the opening up of a subject space where anyone can be counted since it is the space where those of no account are counted” (1999, 36). Subjectification “inscribes a subject name as being different from any identified part of the community” (1999, 37). In short, identification refers to the police order of a community, whereas subjectivation pertains to the political logic that effects a disidentification with the given, enabling a reconfiguration of the field of experience that gives rise to new forms doing, being and saying among subjects within a community.

I argue that it is possible to subsume under the “identification hypothesis” those authors who have understood social justice during early Peronism as the tool through which the masses were socially integrated into the established order, without any structural modification of the field of experience of the subjects that comprise the community. Within this framework, I discuss the works of Gino Germani, and Juan Carlos Torre and Elisa Pastoriza: they, among others, have attempted to situate the Peronist phenomenon within a broader historical continuum. On the contrary, some authors have challenged this understanding of Peronism by proposing the subjectivation hypothesis. In contrast to the first group of theories, which posit that the emergence of the masses led to a process of incorporation into the political order through either the manipulation of the masses or the exploitation of their passivity, the second perspective seeks to understand the Peronist phenomenon as a process of subjectivation that resulted not only in the social inclusion of previously excluded groups, but also in transformations at the subjective level of popular sectors. One could cite the works of Alejandro Groppo and Mercedes Barros as exemplary of this trend, as they have most comprehensively developed the subjectivation hypothesis in relation to early Peronism. In other words, whereas the identification hypothesis tends to emphasize long lines of continuity of order on the surface of history, the subjectivation hypothesis prioritizes the subterranean ruptures generated by those who have shaped this history.

The Identification Hypothesis

The identification hypothesis addresses the irruption of the masses in Argentine politics, sparking numerous reflections on this topic. For instance, Gino Germani analyses Peronism from this perspective:

According to the Italian sociologist, Peronism accomplished an integration and socialization function, albeit through questionable means, which no political party in the 1930s was willing to undertake. His express desire was that, following Peron’s downfall, integration could be fully achieved within the framework of a liberal and progressive democracy (Acha & Quiroga, 2012, 35).

In this context, Germani’s seminal work La integración de las masas a la vida política y el totalitarismo [The Integration of the Masses into Political Life and Totalitarianism](1979), cautions that contemporary political regimes rely on the active or passive acquiescence of the masses. Nevertheless, the fact that masses grant their consent does not preclude the possibility that they may be misled. As Germani notes, “recent history is to a great extent the history of this deceit and neutralization” (1979, 335). Furthermore, Germani proposes a distinction between democracy and totalitarianism based on the assessment of mass participation in politics. When genuine participation occurs, we are dealing with a democracy; conversely, if participation is deceptive or illusory, we are confronted with totalitarianism. Based on this distinction, Germani categorizes the Peronist experience as a form of “totalitarianism.” He does not argue that popular sectors were insincere in their support for the movement; instead, while discussing the common perception of Peron’s leadership as demagogic, Germani notes that the experience of gaining previously inaccessible rights was perceived by the workers as a liberating one (Germani, 1979). Although Peronism did not entail a structural transformation of society, the author acknowledges the realization of certain achievements during this period. Specifically, he mentions the recognition of worker’s rights, which, beyond mere material gains, implied a sense of being recognized among these sectors, and of being part of the community (Germani, 1979).

According to Germani, social justice represents the ideological underpinning of Peronism. He holds that, through this ideology, “Peronism was able to generate the experience of satisfaction (real or imagined) of the interests of the sectors that supported it” (1979, 343). This distinguishes Peronism from European totalitarianism, which achieved similar goals through nationalism and racism, encapsulated in the slogan “order, discipline, hierarchy.” Thus, in this context, social justice is linked to the sense of participation in the political community, stemming from the recognition of rights. However, Germani repeatedly warns against the illusory nature of such participation.

The Argentine political tragedy lay in the fact that the political integration of the popular masses occurred under the auspices of totalitarianism, which succeeded in creating, in its own way, a certain experience of political and social participation in the immediate and personal aspects of the worker’s lives, while simultaneously eroding the political organizations and fundamental rights that form the cornerstone of any genuine democracy (Germani, 1979, 353).

One could claim that, in the context of Germani’s thought, Peronist social justice serves as a primary instrument of totalitarian deception. Through it, the illusion of belonging to a political community can be expanded. This, in turn, reinforces the experience of satisfaction of individual needs among those in disadvantaged sectors, without implying anything more than their integration into the prevailing order.

Juan Carlos Torre (2022) coordinated one of the most cited studies on Peronism: Nueva historia argentina. Los años peronistas (1943–1955) [New Argentine History. The Peronist Years(1943–1955)]. This volume brings together a series of studies on various aspects of early Peronism. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on two of the most emblematic chapters, which are considered essential references. In “Introduction to the Peronist Years,” Torre (2002) establishes a turning point in the history of Argentine politics in the 20th Century: before and after Peronism. In this way, he highlights the significance of the issue under study. However, throughout the chapter, a series of historical evidence is exposed to demonstrate that Peronism constituted what the author terms a “democratization of welfare” (Torre, 2002; Torre & Pastoriza, 2002). The “democratization of welfare” implies that the transformations carried out by Peronism are part of a long and continuous historical trajectory of expanding mass political participation, which clearly originated in the 1930s. In this sense, Peronism represented less the emergence of a new popular subject than the state’s absorption of social forces, for which “a—heteronomous—place was quickly found within a new form of political articulation (Barros, 2014, 320).

In the chapter titled “The Democratization of Welfare,” co-authored by Torre with Elisa Pastoriza, the authors argue that, based on a historical reconstruction of the period, it can be observed that Peronism was not an abrupt transformation, as it shows strong elements of historical continuity (Torre & Pastoriza, 2002).

In fact, Peronism promoted social change but did not propose an alternative culture. Nevertheless, its boldness consisted in creating opportunities that brought within reach of the new majority the values and customs that the middle sectors had already adopted and in which the city took pride (2002, 307).

However, the authors also note that the official discourse of Peronism adopted a “defiant tone” that made powerful and prestigious groups in the country uncomfortable. Torre & Pastoriza point out that the epic dimensions of historical reparation that social reforms took on in Peronist discourse caused concern and disquiet not only among the powerful elite but also among the middle sectors of the population (Torre y Pastoriza, 2002). It is thus possible to discern a degree of tension in the argumentation, as it simultaneously defends the hypothesis that no alternative culture emerged and acknowledges the occurrence of a pronounced cultural clash resulting from the masses’ entry into traditionally exclusive spaces. This raises the following questions: Did such a cultural clash have no effects whatsoever? Does the Peronist legacy as a persistent political identity in the country call into question the alleged lack of configuration of any kind of alternative culture? Or do the changes wrought by Peronism exceed the existing and desirable frameworks? Or is it possible that the formation of an alternative culture occurred after 1955, in the experiences that followed the first Peronist government?

Now, Torre claims that the economic program of 1946—characterized by the expansion of public spending; the central role of the state in production and public services, achieved through nationalization; the fair distribution of income; and incentives for the domestic market—is not an isolated experience in Latin America in the 1940s (Torre, 2002). In this sense, Torre states that, “under the slogan of social justice, the government continued to implement policies that expanded the improvements in the standard of living of the working class through the politics of an incipient welfare State” (2002, 48, my own italics). It is therefore possible to observe a dual continuity: on the one hand, at the local level, where policies of social transformation are targeted towards meeting the needs of popular sectors; on the other hand, these social transformations form part of broader welfare policies implemented at a regional level.

Torres, like Germani, views social justice as the ideological factor that facilitated greater sociopolitical integration of workers through their identification as part of the community. Once again, we observe that social justice is linked to the recognition of the rights of socially marginalized groups, who thereby gain a place, a role, and a name within the political community. Although Torres—unlike Germani—does not explicitly mention the concept of mass manipulation, his framework implies that the masses adopted a passive attitude and merely received favors and social benefits from a popular leader. In this sense, Germani views social justice as a means to recognize the rights of previously excluded sectors and facilitate their social integration; however, this comes at the cost of reinforcing the verticality of the political relationship between the leader and the population.

The subjectivation hypothesis

In the context of the subjectivation hypothesis, Alejandro Groppo, drawing on the discourse theory developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), challenges the interpretation that Peronism was a manipulative movement devoid of ideological content, lacking innovation, and non-revolutionary (Groppo, 2009a). Contrary to this thesis, Groppo argues that Peronism gave rise to a new political subject, paving the way for the emergence of a novel political identity. In this regard, rather than representing continuity, Peronism signifies a rupture with the past. In his doctoral thesis, Los dos principes [The Two Princes](2009a), Groppo starts from the premise that political identities are relational and inherently incomplete, grounded in the notion of the subject as a subject of the lack.^[6] Distancing himself from essentialism, Groppo advocates for the dynamic nature of identities and the possibility of constructing and reconstructing them. If identities are unstable, incomplete and constantly open, the likelihood of deception is reduced, since this involves a process of identification triggered by an interpellation, which frees the political relationship from passivity (Groppo, 2009a).

Now, Groppo suggests that every discourse formation must be anchored in a point: an empty signifier. Following Laclau and Mouffe (1985), he argues that the theoretical function of the empty signifier is “to offer completeness and unity in a dislocated situation, completeness and unity at both the level of identities and that of society as a whole” (2009a:73). As such, social justice would be the empty signifier that articulated Peronist discourse (Groppo, 2009b). According to Groppo’s approach, Peronism offered a non-conditioned vision of social justice: that is, an idea of social justice untethered from any specific determinants, such as economic growth, regional development, economic productivity, among others.

Groppo’s remarks regarding the Catholic Church’s response to Peron’s political intervention are particularly noteworthy. Although certain sectors of the Church, especially those close to popular classes, had frequently invoked the concept of social justice, they nonetheless swiftly adopted the notion of charity as a counterpoint to Peronism. In contrast, Perón consistently referred to his policy decisions in the Labor and Social Security Secretariat as acts of justice, rather than of charity (Groppo, 2009a). The distinction between charity and social justice would become a defining feature of the Peronist understanding of government action.

Similarly, Mercedes Barros (2014) highlights the disruptive nature of the discourse on rights employed by Peronism during its first period, as it marks a departure from the liberal language of rights. Contrary to the hypothesis that portrays Perón as a manipulative leader, Barros identifies in studies on early Peronism a tendency to overlook the processes of subjectivation implicit in the adoption of this new language of rights. To address this, Barros examines the epistolary exchanges between citizens and Perón, as these reveal the subjective constitution of new legal subjects that Peronist discourses enabled and promoted (Barros, 2014).

Additionally, Barros points out that the normalization^[7] of early Peronism carried out by the notion of democratization of the welfare state erases the disruptive and original nature of Peronism. Indeed, Peronism, through its emphasis on the discourse on rights, represented a break with the liberal language of individual rights. Therefore, far from being a “normal and expectable expansion in a welfare-friendly context,” early Peronism founded the expansion of rights on the political language of social justice, understood as defense against the exclusion and inequality of the past. As the author says:

Both social justice and the new social rights gained meaning and were shaped in relation to that part which has not been part of the community, those who had not been previously respected or heard, those who have remained subjugated as “slaves” (Barros, 2013:26).

According to Barros, Peronism entailed a rupture with the preceding imaginary, since it stood in stark contrast to the liberal classical understanding of rights. This rupture involved the introduction of a new language of rights tied to an expansive logic that was difficult to contain and characterized by the reparatory function that social justice undertook. Barros further notes:

By repairing and reconstructing social justice, equity, and community dignity, the scope and substance of the new rights were greatly expanded. At the same time, this process “challenged and subverted” the other field on which individual liberties were hegemonic, and called into question the social relationships that had been shaped by the interests of power, wealth, tradition, religion, and custom (Barros, 2013:31).

Therefore, this version of the subjectivation hypothesis is based on the understanding of the transformation of the concept of rights that occurred during early Peronism and its impact on the subjective positions of those involved in this process. In contrast to the liberal tradition, Peronism implemented a collective reparations policy to address the harm caused by social injustices. Additionally, it led to a redrawing of the boundaries of what was considered legitimate in terms of rights (Barros, 2014). According to Barros, “the defense of the new rights not only protected individuals but also repaired and recreated a new sense of community” (2014:113). Consequently, reparation extended beyond the individual level and was committed to the collective dimension.

Regarding social justice, Barros notes that Perón’s work at the Labor and Social Security Secretariat involved drawing a political boundary with respect to a past marked by exclusion. He also argues that social justice acquires meaning in relation to this boundary, which is shaped by new economic and social content (Barros, 2014). Consequently,

in the new political language, the state took a stance regarding the social damage inflicted, abandoning liberal neutrality and mobilizing justice and rights through promulgations. Both social justice and the new social rights acquire meaning in relation to the marginalized segment of the community (Barros, 2014:109).

Following Groppo, Barros argues that social justice not only entails the reparation of a damage, but also possesses an unconditional character, since it excludes any predicate that could condition its procedure or its meaning. In her own words, social justice is indeterminate.

In summary, and to conclude this analysis, it can be argued that both the identification hypothesis and the subjectivation hypothesis capture the recognition dimension inherent in social justice. However, whereas the first hypothesis views this dimension as merely an instrument for integrating parts into the police order, the second hypothesis posits that social justice serves as the empty signifier that grounds the recognition of rights within the context of Peronist identity, thereby giving rise to a new political subjectivity. While those who view social justice as an identification mechanism understand the forms of inclusion it generates as part of a continuum with the existing order, those who interpret social justice through the lens of the subjectivation hypothesis perceive it as a rupture with the prevailing order, giving rise to the emergence of a new political subject. Identification versus subjectivation, continuity versus discontinuity—these are the two frameworks through which social justice has been conceptualized in the context of scholarly approaches to early Peronism in Argentine political and social thought.

Social justice: between form and content

The subjectivation hypothesis is accurate in understanding social justice as the articulating element of Peronist discourse and in asserting that this discourse disrupted traditional political identities. Nevertheless, it is also worth considering the sedimented contents of the signifier “social justice,” which pose certain resistances to its emptying. As Rodolphe Gasché aptly puts it, one may ask: “how empty can empty be?” (2012).

Indeed, the issue of emptiness in Laclau’s thought has been discussed in the context of his discussion with Judith Butler (2000) regarding formalism. Drawing on Hegel’s critique of Kant, Butler argues that the production and exclusion of the concrete are a precondition for the construction of the formal. According to Butler, formalism is “itself a product of abstraction, and this abstraction requires its separation from the concrete, one that leaves the trace or remainder of this separation in the very working of abstraction itself” (2000, 19). Consequently, abstraction is always contaminated by the concretion from which it attempts to distance itself. Against Kantian formalism, Hegel defends the necessity of a mode of knowledge that immerses itself in the world, that submerges itself in the thing known (Butler, 2000), in order to avoid establishing external relationships between theory and the object theory seeks to know. Building on this premise, Butler critiques Laclau’s understanding of how the particular and the universal relate to each other, an articulation in which empty signifiers play a central role. According to Butler:

if we conceive of universality as an “empty” place, one that is “filled” by specific contents, and further understand political meaning to be the contents with which the empty place is filled, then we posit an exteriority of politics to language […] (Butler, 2000, 34).

In response to these remarks, Laclau specifies that empty signifiers, as a condition of politics and political change, are never entirely empty; instead, they are tendentially empty signifiers (Laclau, 2000a). This enables Laclau to argue that “empty” signifiers are both “names of the unconditioned” and that “they can be, at different moments, identified with the social or political aims of various and divergent groups […] [and that] because they are empty, are not per se attached to any particularistic social and political aim” (2000b, 185). Nevertheless, the universalizing effects examined by hegemony theory originate from specific social and cultural contexts. Consequently, according to Laclau’s interpretation, the concrete constitutes the abstract, which is neither a pre-existing formal dimension nor a dimension separate from the concrete; rather, the concrete tends towards the abstract. Laclau refers to this as a “concrete abstract” (2000b, 191). Empty signifiers belong to this type of abstraction. Laclau claims that

(a) which signifiers will fulfill this function of empty universal representation depends on each social or historical context; (b) the degree to which this process of emptying takes place is also contextually dependent […]; (c) the very logic of empty signifiers has a genealogy of its own—although its formal possibility can be abstractly determined, its historical actualization depends on conditions that are not derivable from that possibility” (2000b, 192).

Previously, inEmancipation(s), Laclau, following Saussure, argued that each signifying system has limits that facilitate differentiation in terms of signification. These limits give rise to exclusions and introduce an ambivalence within the signifying system, where each element possesses its own identity while also being equivalent to other elements insofar as they share the same side of the frontier (2007). Consequently, there exists both difference and equivalence. According to Laclau, empty signifiers are those that enable the dissolution of differences within equivalential chains,^[8] as signification becomes possible when “signifiers empty themselves of their attachment to particular signifieds and assume the role of representing the pure being of the system” (2007, 39). An empty signifier is one that succeeds in transforming its particularity into a body “embodying an unachievable fullness” (2005, 71).

However, Laclau cautions that “not any position in society, not any struggle is equally capable of transforming its own contents in a nodal point that becomes an empty signifier” (2007, 43). Then, what enables a particular demand to assume the role of universality and represent a set of particular demands? Or, how can a demand empty itself to the extent of becoming the signifier that condenses the totality of an equivalential chain? Laclau argues that it is impossible to formally determine the particular content that will become the site of the equivalential effects. This requires an analysis of the particular conjunctures that takes into account the uneven character of the social realm. That is, it is necessary to understand that the equivalential logic is always a tendency that is resisted by the differential logic, and that both logics are overdetermined by each other (Laclau, 2007).

In this sense, Laclau claims that the legitimacy of the content of an empty signifier requires that such content does not “conflict” with what already is. This does not mean that we should cease to recognize that the identification between the empty signifier and its content is a contested terrain among the various political projects that attempt to hegemonize it (Laclau, 2007). At this point, it is useful to introduce the distinction between two levels that emerge in the process by which a signifier comes to condense a set of demands: the ontological and the ontic levels (Laclau, 2015). Although Laclau cautions that the ontological function transcends the ontic contents that inhabit it, and that, at any given moment, the ontological function can be fulfilled by a wide range of ontic contents, this does not imply that the ontic contents are insignificant in the emergence of the empty signifier.

Indeed, it has been noted that the concept of social justice in Argentina embodies certain historically sedimented meanings and has not been associated with a political discourse that opposes the one from which it originated. Therefore, to develop an understanding of social justice that takes into account the determinants that inhabit its historical experience, it is necessary to shift from the ontological level to the ontic level, or, as Butler suggests in a Hegelian vein, to immerse oneself in the phenomenon of social justice in order to undertake its historical actualization.

Finally, the significant overlap between Peronism and social justice should not necessarily lead to the encapsulation of social justice within a specific political identity. On the contrary, it could pave the way for a normative reflection on social justice. Following this line of thought, I will argue here that the demand for justice implies a subjectivation process that not only involves taking the floor, but also requires an other to listen to the demand and acknowledge it as a legitimate right. Thus, I will show that social justice encompasses a three-phase movement: speaking, listening, and recognizing.

Social justice: speaking, listening, recognizing

The preceding discussion has brought us to a starting point in our examination of the concept of social justice. The analysis of the theories grounded in the subjectivation hypothesis reveals an emphasis on the moment when individuals articulate their demands for what they consider just. The fact that many of these approaches draw primarily on letters sent to Perón during his presidency, particularly those received during hist Second Five-Year Plan, is no coincidence. This emphasis was crucial in shifting the understanding of early Peronism, which had previously overlooked the role of agents committed with the process. Building on these insights, I aim to investigate the notion of social justice in greater depth, supplementing the act of taking the floor with two equally important actions: listening and recognizing.

Speaking

Let’s start from the beginning, namely, where our reflections on the subjectivation process left off: speaking. To a large extent, authors who operate under this hypothesis follow the ideas of, among others, Jacques Rancière. In Disagreement (1999), Rancière  revives the Aristotelian teaching that characterizes men as political beings insofar as they possess speech (logos). According to Rancière, the distinction between speech and voice (phoné) becomes crucial, as voice merely expresses pleasure or pain and is present in all animals to the same degree; in contrast, speech conveys the just and the unjust, the good and the evil, and is unique to men^[9] who form a political community.

According to Rancière, politics is characterized by the absence of a foundation and the purely contingent nature of social orders. However, he also argues that every social order consists of a relationship between two parties: those who command and those who obey. Nevertheless, the functioning of the social order relies on the fact that those who obey must understand both the order and the duty to obey (Rancière, 1999). Consequently, equality is necessary for inequality to operate. The author takes this idea even further:

Politics exists because the logos is never simply speech, because it is always indissolubly the account that is made of this speech: the account by which a sonorous emission is understood as speech, capable of enunciating what is just, whereas some other emission is merely perceived as a noise signaling pleasure or pain, consent or revolt (1999, 22-23).

Thus, politics is the dispute over who takes the floor. When some bodies abandon their assigned places, discourses that were previously regarded as mere noise become visible and audible: at this point, politics emerges. In summary, the political question revolves around who is or are part of the common issues. For Rancière, politics is a matter of subjects or of “modes of subjectivation” that involve the denaturalization of an assigned place and the creation of a space where everyone can be counted as part of the community. Consequently, political subjectivation implies a disidentification, which means gaining distance from previously established community identities. As Rancière puts it,

political subjectification redefines the field of experience that gave to each their identity with their lot. It decomposes and recomposes the relationships between the ways of doing, of being, and of saying that define the perceptible organization of the community (1999, 40).

Undoubtedly, the ideas from Rancière possess a theoretical potency for the analysis of early Peronism. For example, in the same vein, Mercedes Barros (2016) analyses once again the epistolary exchanges in order to illuminate the meaning deployed “from the bottom.” She does this because she notices a certain void in the study of the identitarian configuration of the Peronist popular political subject that can be filled with the use of the letters as a privileged methodological source for the analysis of subjective threads (Barros, 2016). Without denying how opaque these sources can be, Barros states the following:

the aim is to disentangle the rules that govern the language games of those who take the floor, but also to tie the threads together to give consistency to a subjectivity that is deployed through them, not as a purely intentional individuality, but as a swarm of meanings that articulate a socially, historically and culturally constructed body (2016, 242; my italics).

The decentered and dispersed approach offered by Barros, using the letters as a source, allows for illumination of the subjective political process during early Peronism, a process through which an active subject reappropriates the discourse and, sometimes unintentionally, questions the previously given field of experience (Barros, 2016). Hence, as a political gesture, the letters reveal how “the subject puts into words what makes them common to the community’s social order, while simultaneously and paradoxically expressing their own exclusion as a speaking being” (Barros, 2016, 254). As such, taking the floor aims to intervene in the game of social relations. For example, Barros, together with Virginia Morales and María Marta Quintana (2023), analyses the letters sent to Perón by women. Here, it is possible to observe that “they considered themselves as part of a new political order” (Barros et.al., 2023). Following Rancière’s theory of political subjectivation, the authors point out how women carried out a significant displacement: from requesting favors to demanding justice, thereby highlighting the contradiction between being part of the community and not being part of it. Thus, while conforming to a patriarchal, maternal, Catholic, and servile ideology, they also expressed their demands, needs, criticisms, and even suggestions. In doing so, they were able to “distort the norms of recognition and alter the (in)proper places of existence. In this way, the letters allow us to see how the rhetoric of equality and social justice enabled the public emergence of women from popular sectors” (Barros et.al., 2023).

Sebastián Barros (2014) describes the constitution of a new subjectivity implicit in the process of taking the floor, a key aspect of the Peronist experience, as the ability to “put the world into words.” The assumption of the ability to speak on the part of subjects produces a dislocation of assigned social positions. In this regard, the author identifies three essential characteristics of the process of “putting the world into words.” 1) Popular identifications present themselves in the form of “being-like-someone,” which implies, on the one hand, a tension between identification and Rancière’s concept of disidentification and, on the other hand, a conflictive displacement of the limits and frontiers that demarcate a new subjectivity, as new differences are established. 2) The “cessation-of-being” alters self-esteem and esteem for others; 3) This change in self-esteem implies a demand to be heard. According to Barros, “to the extent that one ceases-to-be and rightfully appropriates a word one did not previously possess, the new subject demands the right to be heard” (Barros, 2014, 337). Here, we can see the relationship between talking and listening

Taking the floor is, therefore, crucial in the process of subjectivation implied in the demands for social justice. However, as I have already suggested, one can suspect that taking the floor is not sufficient for the realization of social justice. Taking the floor will therefore be a necessary but insufficient step towards achieving justice. If someone takes the floor, it is because they are addressing someone else. The availability of the other person, so that the demand can be made, is essential within political processes. Thus, in politics, listening is just as important as speaking; and early Peronism illustrates this. From the moment the Peronist government created multiple spaces where requests, complaints, and demands could be received, it is possible to speak of an expansion of listening (Acha, 2004). The establishment of new public institutions across the country ensured access, if not to justice itself, then at least to the opportunity to express demands that were previously unutterable (Palacio, 2018).

Listening

As Sebastián Barros argues (2014), talking and listening are intertwined, to the extent that the appropriation of a previously denied word implies a demand to be heard. As he puts it,

referring to listening in politics presupposes the existence of a word to be heard. However, from our perspective, it is important to emphasize listening: although, according to Rancière, within politics a subject emerges that demands a voice that enunciates the common and does not merely express, shouting, a need or pain, the effect on community life is related to the reverberations of listening to such a voice, rather than just to its enunciation (Barros, 2020, 10; my italics).

In the same vein, Marilina Truccone (2021) suggests that the importance of social justice during early Peronism was tied to the hearing of demands and the search for solutions. She claims: “Peronism came, in brief, to solve problems (Truccone, 2021, no page number). Therefore, the act of taking the floor by new political subjects within Peronism implied, if not the certainty, at least the expectation of being heard. The epistolary exchanges available in the National General Archive reveal a fluid conversation between the government and the people.

Iris Marion Young (1990) highlights the relevance of listening for the realization of social justice, drawing on the work of Jean François Lyotard. As Young notes, quoting Lyotard:

For us, a language is first and foremost someone talking. But there are language games in which the important thing is to listen, in which the rule deals with audition. Such a game is the game of the just. And in this game, one speaks only inasmuch as one listens, that is, one speaks as a listener, and not as an author (Young, 1990, 4; my italics).

Following this idea, Young concludes that “rational reflection on justice begins in a hearing, in heeding a call, rather than in asserting and mastering a state of affairs, however ideal” (1990, 5). One need only recall Perón’s call for contributions to help develop the Second Five-Year Plan—“Perón wants to know what his people need”—, to demonstrate the willingness to listen exhibited by Peronism during its first government.

However, there is a crucial observation from Young that is also valuable for the analysis of early Peronism: every normative reflection should begin with the historical circumstances in which it emerges. In other words, concerns about justice must be situated within the context in which one seeks to achieve it. Therefore, it is impossible to reflect on social justice in Argentina without referencing the historical period that has left indelible marks on the understanding of what is considered socially just. One can enumerate a series of advancements in the realm of rights that were achieved during that era and that are, today, part of Argentina’s cultural heritage, to the extent that they transcend specific political identities. However, the conquest of each of these rights—which, from then until now, has shaped the meaning of social justice—is the result of the act of taking of the floor by those who were affected by injustices, the listening to the anguished cries by those who had the resources to repair the damage, and the recognition of everyone’s right to live their life with dignity. Let’s now examine the final component of the triad of social justice: recognizing.

Recognizing

Recognition and social justice are two signifiers that are often closely linked in contemporary theories of justice. The debate between Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth (2003) regarding whether social justice pertains to redistribution or recognition is well-known, as are the numerous discussions it sparked. It is reasonable to follow the trajectory of recognition theories, as they are relevant in the analyses on Peronism—from Germani to Barros—where, as it has been shown, the understanding of social justice as recognition of rights is a prominent theme. Therefore, it is interesting to consider here the theories of Axel Honneth, who offers a systematic examination of the relationship between recognition and social justice. My objective here is not to provide an exhaustive overview of Honneth’s theory of recognition, but rather to highlight specific elements that contribute to our understanding of social justice within early Peronism in Argentina. To this end, I focus on how recognition, subjective formation, and social justice intersect.

According to Honneth, recognition is a fundamental condition for the self-realization of individuals. In Hegelian terms, one can argue that “when an individual’s self-consciousness depends on the recognition from other self-consciousness, we can speak of a state of being outside oneself [Selbst-findung] and of self-realization” (Siep, 2014:11). Or, in Honneth’s own words:

in the first instance, “mutual recognition” merely refers to the reciprocal experience of seeing ourselves confirmed in the desires and aims of the other, because the other’s existence represents a condition for fulfilling our own desires and aims (2014:44-45)

Based on this understanding and drawing primarily on the three forms of ethical life developed by Hegel in Jena, as well as on empirical knowledge from the social sciences, Honneth posits the existence of three spheres of intersubjective recognition (Siep, 2014): love, achievement, and legal equality (Honneth, 1997). Briefly, in the sphere of love, individuals mutually confirm each other as beings with needs and develop trust in themselves. In the sphere of achievement, individuals seek recognition of their socially valued capabilities and faculties. Finally, in the sphere of legal equality, individuals seek recognition as they participate in the collective construction of the will (Honneth, 1995). According to Honneth, the dynamics in each sphere of social life allow us to evaluate the relationships within them and determine whether we are dealing with a socially just order or not. Therefore, both social justice and recognition aim to guarantee social relationships of recognition that enable the formation of personal identity or self-realization (Fraser & Honneth, 2003).

Now, reciprocal recognition relationships are constitutive of the subjective formation of individuals. Moreover, the more egalitarian these relationships are, the more just the social order in which individuals participate. Therefore, Honneth highlights the importance of the institutional dimension in securing the conditions under which recognition relationships can develop. For instance, in Freedom’s Right (2014), after outlining the three notions of freedom that have shaped modern political thought, Honneth engages with some Hegelian reflections on freedom and argues that

A subject is only “free” if it encounters another subject, within the framework of institutional practices, to whom it is joined in a relationship of mutual recognition; only then can it regard the aims of the other as the condition for the realization of its own aims (2014: 45).

Honneth is interested in freedom in this context because, according to him, each notion of freedom implies a specific understanding of social justice (Honneth, 2014). Drawing on Hegel, Honneth posits the notion of social freedom, which “is rooted in a conception of social institutions in which subjects can grasp each other as the other of their own selves” (2014: 44). Thus, institutions become the medium that provides the guarantees of mutual understanding, enabling the self-realization of individuals and, consequently, the realization of social justice.

This link between recognition, subjectivation, and social justice can be observed in the context of early Peronism. For instance, the Statute of the Rural Worker (Estatuto del Peón, Decree-Law N. 28.169) in 1944 aimed to recognize rural workers as legitimate laborers, thereby addressing the significant injustices they faced. As Barros notes, Perón acknowledged that the rural workers lived under “conditions even worse than slavery” (2014). According to Perón:

These people work for fifteen or twenty pesos a month and enjoy no more benefits than slaves, since a slave is maintained by his master even in old age, whereas the rural worker, when old and no longer useful, receives a slap (Barros, 2014:108).

Thus, with the expansion of the legal framework protecting those who worked in rural areas, they are recognized as workers and freed from a situation akin to “slavery.” Through this recognition, these rural laborers begin to consolidate a new subjective position, enabling a freer and more egalitarian development, and consequently, a more just social order.

In short, it can be argued that the key insight derived from the Peronist experience, an idea that persists in Argentine political culture but has transcended the political identity in which it was initially formed, is that social justice, as well as the expansion of the awareness regarding rights, emerges through the complex and challenging process of speaking, listening, and recognizing.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the discussion of the debate between “identification and subjectivation” has allowed us to shed light on the role of social justice in contemporary political thought. Under the identification hypothesis, early Peronism is understood as a new chapter in the integration of the masses into political life or in the process of democratization through welfare policies, wherein social justice plays an instrumental role. In contrast, the subjectivation hypothesis views Peronism as part of the process of subjective constitution of the popular sectors, in which social justice functions as an empty signifier that unites the social meanings of demands for reparations of injustices. While the identification hypothesis obscures the disruptive nature of the Peronist experience, the subjectivation hypothesis emphasizes the profound and disruptive impact that Peronism had on Argentine political life.

Building on the conclusions of the subjectivation hypothesis, this paper sought to advance an alternative understanding of social justice that originated in early Peronism. I have demonstrated that the realization of social justice involves a three-part movement: speaking, listening, and recognizing. The exploration of multiple sources—including epistolary exchanges, official discourse and the legal framework—sheds new light on this understanding of social justice.

Social justice, being central to our political experience, should be carefully examined in contexts where the meaning of justice is at risk. A theoretical-political perspective can provide an analysis of social justice that, while maintaining its situated character, offers a normative reflection that puts the concept into motion.

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^[1] This paper is part of the research undertaken in the context of my doctoral scholarship, which was supported by CONICET. A previous version of this paper was presented in the VIII Congress of Peronist Studies, held at the National University Arturo Jauretche in Florencio Varela, Province of Buenos Aires, Argentina. I would like to express my gratitude to Juan Pablo de Nicola, Mercedes Barros, Virginia Morales, and Marilina Truccone for their thorough reading of this work and valuable comments on it. Their insightful observations have enabled me to broaden my general understanding of this topic and to refine the ideas discussed in this text. emilse_toninello@hotmail.com.

^[2] Although one could argue that justice is a perennial concern in political thought, as defended by Leo Strauss in “What is Political Philosophy?”(1988), it is undeniable that the question of justice has gained renewed significance over the past 50 years, particularly since the publication of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice in 1971, a work that continues to inspire both widespread agreement and intense debate.

^[3] The concept of “problematization” is based on the ideas of Foucault, who posits that “problematization” involves a process of estrangement from our surrounding world, allowing us to examine the theoretical and practical contexts that underlie established meanings. See Nosetto & Wieczorek (2021); Foucault (1992).

^[4] When referring to “police,” the author does not mean security forces, but rather the broader sense of the term that was prevalent during the 17th and 18th centuries, which relates to the general disposition of the sensible, that is, the modes in which bodies are distributed within a community. See Disagreement (1999), 29. As Rancière notes, Michel Foucault extensively examined how 17^th and 18^th-century thinkers understood “police” as a government technique aimed at “’man’ and his ‘happiness’” (Ranciere, 1999, 28; Foucault, 2007).

^[5] By “distribution of the sensible,” Rancière understands “the system of self-evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and positions within it. A distribution of the sensible therefore establishes at one and the same time something common that is shared and exclusive parts. This apportionment of parts and positions is based on a distribution of spaces, times, and forms of activity that determines the very manner in which something common lends itself to participation and in what way various individuals have a part in this distribution” (2004, 12).

^[6] Ernesto Laclau has borrowed this concept from Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory. Similarly, Groppo explains that “the subject is presented as a ‘subject of the lack’, a subject that always requires an other (such as a discourse, another subject, society, etc.) to constitute itself” (2009a: 59).

^[7] The concept of “normalization” was introduced by Acha & Quiroga (2012) to describe those interpretations of Peronism that emphasize continuity, which have previously dominated the field of historiography.

^[8] Although Laclau employs the term “dissolution” in Emancipation(s) (2007, first published in 1996), in On Populist Reason (2005) he clarifies that the equivalential logic does not eradicate differences, as this would eliminate the very possibility of establishing equivalences. While the two logics are incompatible, they are simultaneously necessary for the construction of a social identity. See particularly “The ‘People’ and the Discursive Production of Emptiness” (Laclau, 2005).

^[9] I retain the (false) masculine universal, not only to remain faithful to the original quotes, but also to avoid conceptual maneuvers or theoretical disputes that are not the primary focus of this paper.